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Abstract
Climate governance scholars have recognized the role of public participation in
improving the outcomes of climate action. Nevertheless, increasing advocacy of envi-
ronmental authoritarianism in the narratives of climate governance questions the
need for and legitimacy of public participation. This study uncovers the emerging
dynamics of climate participation in Chinese communities through a case of the
implementation of solar energy. Our research challenges the general impression of
nonparticipation in climate governance in China and argues that participation is tak-
ing a less visible form that we call “defensive participation.” Defensive participation
occurs when communities mobilize to defend their interests. Just as other forms of
public participation, defensive participation can play important roles in improving pol-
icy outcomes and accountability. More nuanced theoretical and empirical accounts of
public participation in climate governance will improve current understandings of cli-
mate governance in China.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Increasing involvement of actors beyond-the-state in actions for cli-
mate change mitigation has led to a rising interest in their role and
operation (Newell, 2008; Andonova & Mitchell, 2010; Schroeder &
Lovell, 2012; Paterson, 2014; Bulkeley & Newell, 2015; Chan et al.,
2015; Pattberg & Widerberg, 2015; Falkner, 2016; Nasiritousi,
Hjerpe, & Linnér, 2016; Bäckstrand & Kuyper, 2017; Bäckstrand,
Kuyper, Linnér, & Lövbrand, 2017). Empirical evidence suggests that
active participation of civil society, including NGOs and communities,
supports the formulation of policies to alleviate climate change. For
example, civil society plays a key role in improving the accountability
of policymakers (Newell, 2008). Local communities are equipped with
context-sensitive knowledge that can play essential roles in project
design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of mitigation
actions (Bäckstrand et al., 2017). Instead of being passive recipients of
public policies, communities and citizens are increasingly engaging in
climate governance (Klenk et al., 2015; Meadow et al., 2015). Partici-
patory approaches are the staple of multilevel governance, which is
becoming an increasingly common mode of climate change gover-
nance. Examples of participatory strategies for climate change action
have been described in different countries, such as the UK (Stagl,
2006), Denmark (Mendonça, Lacey, & Hvelplund, 2009; Sovacool,
2013), the Netherlands (van Buuren, Driessen, Teisman, & van
Rijswick, 2014), India (Tanner, Mitchell, Polack, & Guenther, 2009),
and Mozambique (Castán Broto, Boyd, & Ensor, 2015).
China has implemented a variety of initiatives to reduce its green-
house gas emissions (NDRC, 2015). Some commentators have pointed
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out that China is successfully moving towards a transition to sustain-
able energy (Schreurs, 2017; Urban, 2018). China's positive results in
climate change mitigation are often attributed to the strong political
leadership of the government (Barbi, Ferreira, & Guo, 2016; Chen &
Lees, 2016; Hochstetler & Kostka, 2015; Lewis, 2012; Lo & Howes,
2013; Mol, 2015; Shen & Xie, 2018). In these accounts, China's cli-
mate governance lacks a culture of participation in decision-making
(Gilley, 2012; Li, 2013). If China is moving forward with climate ambi-
tions under an authoritarian regime of environmental governance that
lacks participation, what does this mean for governance theories that
argue for the need to involve multiple publics to facilitate a sustain-
ability transformation? If the case of China represents the success of
an authoritarian, nonparticipatory regime, are participatory
approaches needed for effective climate action? Some have even used
the example of China to suggest that authoritarian regimes might be
more capable of generating policy outputs than democratic ones
(Beeson, 2010; Sowers, 2007). This perspective, however, arises from
a bird's eye analysis of China's policy, as detailed analysis of local
implementation and impacts of climate change policies are still scarce
and limited to well-known examples, such as carbon trading in Shang-
hai (Lo, 2013; Wu, Qian, & Li, 2014) and eco-city schemes, such as
the one implemented in Tianjin (Caprotti, 2014; Caprotti, Springer, &
Harmer, 2015). More detailed analysis of local experimentation may
help to understand the complexity of climate governance in China,
and the multiple ways in which participation happens, which defy the
conventions of Western-inspired environmental governance theory.
Responding to these concerns, our research question is to what
extent participation in climate governance is common in China, and
how it happens.
In Western liberal democracies, political participation was origi-
nally conceived as actions aiming to influence the selection of elected
politicians or their programs of action (Verba, Nie, & Kim, 1972). Acts
of resistance, for instance in the form of demonstrations and protests,
were eventually incorporated into the concept (Barnes & Kaase,
1979). Against a backdrop of a decline in traditional forms of partici-
pation in the Western world in the 2000s, political scientists docu-
mented a surge in novel forms of political expressions, such as
political consumerism and civic group engagement, which also became
seen as political participation (Dalton, 2014; Norris, 2002). Public par-
ticipation was always conceived as a function of democracy, and
hence, absent in authoritarian contexts.
Climate change is a complex domain where political action
requires engagement across sectors and everyday activities
(e.g., Bulkeley & Newell, 2015), making participation central to effec-
tive climate action. Climate participation encompasses multiple pro-
cesses, including party politics, protests, civic actions, and hands-on
projects, all with an explicit climate change agenda. In China, protests
and civic actions led by green NGOs are increasingly influential in cli-
mate change policy (Liu, Wang, & Wu, 2017; Zhan & Tang, 2013).
However, analyses of how everyday interactions between citizens can
influence climate change are still missing.
We analyse a case of community involvement in climate change
governance during the implementation of a solar energy project in a
residential community, the Qiaoxiang Village, in Shenzhen. The case
challenges current definitions of participation and analyses of climate
governance in China. First, the case shows that authoritarian gover-
nance is not suited to create long-lasting cultural changes that perme-
ate society as a whole. Moreover, authoritarian governance may have
unintended negative consequences on projects related to people's daily
life. Second, the case demonstrates the operation of forms of participa-
tion less visible because they are embedded in people's lives. In this
case, we observe “defensive participation.” First coined by Weale
(1999), this form of participation denotes participatory action that is
taken to protect one's interests from being compromised or to avoid
possible negative impacts. Just as other forms of participation, defen-
sive participation can influence policy outcomes and accountability.
The article proceeds as follows. We review key debates on partic-
ipatory climate governance in Section 2 and the role of participation
in climate governance in China in Section 3. We introduce the study
area, material, and methodology in Section 4. Section 5 presents the
case of Qiaoxiang Village in Shenzhen, China, focusing on the partici-
pation practices of the community and the negotiations between dif-
ferent actors. We discuss the mechanisms and features of climate
participation within the Chinese context in Section 6 and conclude
with broader implications in Section 7.
2 | KEY DEBATES ON PARTICIPATORY
CLIMATE GOVERNANCE
The dominant thought on climate change governance in the 2000s
prioritized the action of leading actors, such as local governments, that
needed political will to deliver and implement action. This perspective
placed less emphasis on discursive forms of environmental gover-
nance that put a stronger emphasis on the process of decision-making
(Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006; Bulkeley & Kern, 2006; Betsill & Rabe,
2009; Okereke, Bulkeley, & Schroeder, 2009; Bailey, Gouldson, &
Newell, 2011; Bulkeley & Newell, 2015; Newell et al., 2015). When
the 2015 Paris Agreement established voluntary approaches to cli-
mate governance as the primary paradigm (Hale, 2016), it also sig-
naled a turn toward understanding the process through which
governance occurs. This approach highlighted the coordinating role of
orchestrating actors at multiple levels of governance (Bäckstrand &
Kuyper, 2017). Research on urban labs (Wagner & Minca, 2014),
experimentation (Bulkeley, Castán Broto, & Edwards, 2014), multi-
actor transition processes (Frantzeskaki, Castán Broto, Coenen, &
Loorbach, 2016) and adaptive governance (Boyd and Folke, 2011)
map an ever-expanding set of actors in decisions for climate change
governance.
Participatory climate governance brings together different tradi-
tions of thought from politics and development studies to provide an
alternative to rationalist paradigms on traditional environmental man-
agement that dominated during the 1990s (Kapoor, 2001). Coopera-
tive environmental management theorists embraced participatory
methods and the development of partnerships as forms of social regu-
lation that responded to the environmental crisis (Glasbergen, 1998).
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A broad body of work followed that relied on multiple methods to
bring a diverse range of actors into environmental management in
areas such as participatory multi-criteria evaluation, participatory
modeling of future scenarios, and participatory citizen science
(Emrouznejad et al., 2010; Konidari & Mavrakis, 2007; Watson & Hud-
son, 2015). Since then, participation has become an essential manage-
ment tool in the toolbox of environmental planners.
As participation gained increasing importance in environmental
governance, Cooke and Kothari (2001) made a devastating critique of
participation as the dominant approach to international development,
whereby international development elites could capture and legiti-
mate development projects. While elite capture has become a central
concern for participatory professionals (Lund & Saito-Jensen, 2013;
Persha & Andersson, 2014), scholars have continued challenging the
fairness of participatory processes in local governance processes
(Everatt, Marais, & Dube, 2010; Kundu, 2011; Rigon, 2014).
Many participatory professionals have witnessed with dismay the
move towards an understanding of participation as a managerial tool,
rather than as a tool for empowerment (Chambers & Foster, 1983).
Hickey and Mohan (2004) responded to Cooke and Kothari (2001), first
by presenting the process of participation as one which is incomplete,
ongoing, and that requires the purchase of those involved. Such think-
ing resonates closely with concerns with participation that emerge at
the intersection of environmental justice and political ecology. Building
on Iris Marion Young's (2011) notion of justice as recognition, process-
based concerns about environmental decision-making have gained gro-
und in environmental justice debates (Agyeman, Bullard, & Evans,
2003; Schlosberg & Carruthers, 2010). In urban areas, participatory pro-
cesses often led by informal settlement dwellers have brought about
massive changes in service provision and the overall sustainability in
those settlements (Nour, 2011; Otsuki, 2016). The notion of empower-
ment has been in itself subject to critiques about the extent to which
people can be empowered just by being told what to do, but activists
and communities have been able to demonstrate that they can mobilize
and claim a space in climate governance. For example, many climate
justice activists asking for participation demand that citizens and com-
munities play a stronger role in climate governance (Bulkeley,
Edwards, & Fuller, 2014). While participation is clearly incorporated
into practices of community resilience, the role of participation in car-
bon emissions reduction activities is more ambiguous. In many ways,
the rise of climate change experiments, including many community-led
initiatives for renewable energy or waste management, can be thought
of as a response to the lack of visible opportunities for participation of
different groups in the international climate regime (Hoffmann, 2011).
This can be seen as an active response to build new spaces of gover-
nance in a context in which alternative voices are foreclosed.
3 | THE ROLE OF PARTICIPATION IN
CLIMATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA
The highly centralized features of the state in China have fragmented
over the past three decades, while political power has diffused across
an increasing number of actors (Dumbaugh & Martin, 2011; Lie-
berthal & Lampton, 1992; Sun, 2016; Tsang & Kolk, 2010). Non-state
actors are acquiring new functions and providing input into decision-
making processes in environmental policy at multiple levels (Carter &
Mol, 2013; Lo, Li, & Chen, 2020; Mai & Francesch-Huidobro, 2014).
The formulation of energy policy involves the participation of para-
statal research bodies (also labeled government-owned NGOs), corpo-
rations, and actors in transnational networks (Meidan, Andrews-
Speed, & Xin, 2009; Schroeder, 2008; Shen, 2017; Tsang & Kolk,
2010). The industry is an important source of knowledge in climate
experimentation at the local level (Lo et al., 2020). While the forma-
tion and operation of NGOs in China have challenges (e.g., Ho, 2007),
green organizations are among the most active and influential in
China's civil society. Zhan and Tang (2013) have documented the abil-
ity of green NGOs to express ideas, exchange information, and
achieve collective goals through educational campaigns and nonco-
nfrontational projects.
New communication channels in social media create spaces for
participatory capacity (Tang, 2014). Collaborative networks between
local citizens, media, advocacy groups, and lawyers have created
opportunities to influence local decision-making processes (Ergenc,
2014). Local councils engage the public in debates through various
formats, such as consultative meetings, deliberation in village elec-
tions, citizen evaluations, and residential assemblies (He & Warren,
2011; Leib & He, 2006). Analyzing these interactions, Leib and He
(2006) describe China as an authoritarian system at a macro level with
democratizing practices materializing at a micro-level. Zhou (2012)
proposes that these processes evidence a state-led immature deliber-
ative democracy. This is perhaps tolerated to maintain stability and
political legitimacy at the local level while avoiding reform of the over-
all system.
Nevertheless, the evidence of participation in China remains
anecdotal (Geall & Hilton, 2014). Public participation often serves a
procedural function and is closely supervised by the state (Sun, 2016).
Qi and Zhang (2014) argue that public participation in China is ineffec-
tive because of a lack of data and accountability. Westman, Castán
Broto, & Huang (2019) show that nonstate organizations and commu-
nities play little role in climate governance, and public participation
means little more than consultation. Elite capture prevails in rural
China, where local elites dominate participation processes within pov-
erty eradication programs (Tian, Speelman, & Zuo, 2019), land reforms
(Wilmsen, 2016) and welfare programs (Han and Gao, 2019).
Some scholars argue that ideologies of social subordination and
obedience, deeply rooted in the Chinese Confucian philosophy, shape
Chinese people's participation in governance (Dang, 2018). This argu-
ment legitimizes the operation of the authoritarian regime. Moreover,
limited access to climate knowledge results in a relatively low level of
public awareness about climate change-related issues (Du et al.,
2018). As noted by Martens (2006, p. 212), “public participation in the
field of China's environment remains heavily influenced by the power
relations that are typically associated with an authoritarian regime.”
Yet, environmental governance in China cannot be reduced to the
operations of an authoritarian state. Participation in climate politics in
308 HUANG ET AL.
China takes place in a manner that remains invisible to forms of analy-
sis that rely on participatory accounts of governance in a Western
context. Weale (1999, p. 128) defined “defensive participation” as par-
ticipation “where one participates only to prevent other people from
damaging one's own interests.” Weale describes a situation in which
individuals are aware of others' interests conflicting with their own,
and where participation produces no gain for either side. Following
Weale, defensive participation in China (weiquanshi canyu) emerges as
a distinct mode of climate governance.
First, defensive participation follows individual or community
resistance to a specific issue. Some commentators have noted that
public participation in China has been driven by individual interests.
This has raised critiques akin to those in the West about people that
protest to protect their neighborhood, but not similar developments
elsewhere, that is, “not-in-my-backyard” (NIMBYism) (Sun, 2016;
Wang, Sun, Yang, & Yuan, 2016; Xu, 2007). For example, Wang et al.
(2016) showed that Chinese citizens would not join anti-smog activi-
ties unless the activities benefit or harm their own interests. Social
mobilization and protest also emerge as a defense reaction to
government-led environmental policy (Deng & Yang, 2013; Han,
Swedlow, & Unger, 2014; Mertha, 2014). In this context, we under-
stand defensive participation as a reactive political behavior that fol-
lows conflict and need. Defensive participation differs markedly from
deliberative engagement in planning or managing projects, moving
instead to the terrain of protest (rather than proactive engagement)
and resistance (rather than deliberation). Defensive participation may
be the only avenue open to residents and communities who face
large-scale changes in their neighborhood.
Second, defensive participation can act as an alternative mecha-
nism to ensure accountability within a political apparatus with limited
democratic functions. In a democratic system, accountability is
exercised by making political agents answerable and responsible for
their actions. The assumptions are that information about political
interventions is available, that public bads can be attributed to
decision-makers, and that responsibility entails consequences for neg-
ative outcomes (for example, through elections or disciplinary proce-
dures) (Palumbo, 2017). While such mechanisms are unavailable on a
macro-level in China, researchers have shown that nonelectoral local
institutions, such as mechanisms of local revenue collection, channels
of public disclosure, or the work of solidarity groups (Su & Yang,
2005; Tsai, 2007), provide alternative entry points to secure local gov-
ernment delivery on citizen demands. Informal accountability func-
tions as a mechanism that ensures that local government “will provide
public goods responsibly” (Tsai, 2007, p. 356). The critical level is the
communication of citizens' preferences to local decision-makers to
prevent the delivery of public bads. When policies fail at the local
level, defensive participation is activated to signal discontent and rec-
tify the lack of positive outputs. Defensive participation thereby
operates as a micro-level mechanism to ensure accountability against
failures in the delivery of public goods at the local level. This view on
ensuring accountability by monitoring policy delivery (an output-
oriented view) links with ideas on political legitimacy in China. China's
political system is often assumed to maintain stability through its
production of substantive political legitimacy, the idea being that
delivery of benefits such as prosperity, modernity, equity, and envi-
ronmental protection produces support for the political leadership
(Guo, 2003). To reproduce political legitimacy at the local level, it is
necessary to have communicative mechanisms for discontent related
to public goods in place, which is why defensive participation plays an
important role.
Third, because it takes place within a semiauthoritarian system,
defensive participation is likely to have restricted access to traditional
political channels. In the absence of formal mechanisms to submit
complaints or engage local officials, residents use alternative channels,
such as appealing to higher levels of government, engaging media, or
accessing the legal system (Van Rooij et al., 2014; Minchun & Bao,
2012). Due to these restrictions, defensive participation is likely to be
opportunistic and ad hoc, experimenting with different methods in
the search for strategies that work.
Building upon the concept of “defensive participation,” our analy-
sis in the case of Qiaoxiang village in Shenzhen suggests that public
participation in China is not uncommon, although it takes place in dif-
ferent ways than those that have been traditionally described in the
literature. The case analyses the particularities, mechanisms, and
effects of public participation in China's climate governance.
4 | STUDY AREA, MATERIAL, AND
METHODOLOGY
Shenzhen is a coastal city located in the southeast of China, immedi-
ately to the north of Hong Kong. It has a population of 12.52 million,
and the urban built-up area is 923.25 km2 (SBSM, 2018). Among Chi-
nese cities, Shenzhen has led multiple initiatives to deliver urban low-
carbon transitions. Shenzhen was among the eight low carbon pilot
cities selected in 2010 by the National Development Reform Commis-
sion (NDRC, 2015). This was one of the first national-level programs
for low-carbon urban development in China, under which Shenzhen's
municipal government committed to increasing the share of natural
gas, solar PV, biomass and wind energy to at least 60% of the total
primary energy use in 2020 (Khanna et al., 2014). In the building sec-
tor, renewable energies have been implemented at a large scale and in
a mandatory fashion. As early as 2006, the municipal government of
Shenzhen promulgated the mandatory installation of solar water
heating (SWH) systems in newly built buildings. In the same year, the
design of a roof-mounted SWH system in Qiaoxiang village was initi-
ated to make the neighborhood a national role model for energy sav-
ing in buildings (Shenzhen Evening News, 2006).
As shown in Figure 1, Qiaoxiang village is an affordable housing
community constructed by the municipal government of Shenzhen,
covering a total area of 0.18 km2 and a total construction area of
0.51 km2. Completed in 2009, it was at that time the city's first dem-
onstration project for the application of SWH systems in high-rise
buildings. The SWH system involves a total investment of RMB 23.68
million, which is claimed to be the world's largest SWH system
installed in high-rise buildings (Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 2016b).
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There are 22 high-rise buildings in the neighborhood, with a total floor
level ranging from 32 to 35 floors. A total of 2,160 apartments in the
upper 18 floors of each building are equipped with SWH facilities.
The SWH system in Qiaoxiang village was put into use in 2012. How-
ever, functional problems emerged after only 4 years' service, and
multiple actors got involved in a contentious negotiation process over
the fate of the SWH project.
Our methodology analyses the emergence of participatory pro-
cesses in climate governance over time, examining the broader conse-
quences for the community. The primary empirical materials were
collected during a field trip to Shenzhen in 2017. As shown in Table 1,
32 semistructured interviews were conducted with government offi-
cials (2), local media (2), industry experts (1), and residents of
Qiaoxiang village (27). In addition to interviewees who were reached
through personal contacts, on-site interviews with residents were
conducted by four investigators in the neighborhood of Qiaoxiang vil-
lage from September 29 to October 1, 2017. A document analysis
based on data sources of government reports, policy documents, and
local newspapers complemented the analysis of interview data.
5 | EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The analysis shows the different stages of defensive participation in
Qiaoxiang village. Table 2 provides an overview of the main actors
involved.
5.1 | SWH installation in Qiaoxiang village:
Authoritarian governance and the tendency of
nonparticipation of residents
Since the early 2000s, responding to intensive low-carbon policies at
the national level, Shenzhen started the radical application of renew-
able energies, and the city was listed by the Ministry of Housing and
Urban–Rural Development (MOHURD) as a pilot city for various
national-level initiatives of energy conservation and environment pro-
tection. Early in August 2004, MOHURD designated Shenzhen as the
“Pilot City for the Application of Building Energy Saving Regulation in Hot
Summer and Warm Winter Zone.” Later in 2006, Shenzhen was
selected as the “Pilot City for the Scaling-up of Renewable Energy (Solar
Energy) Buildings” and the “National Pilot City for the Modernization of
Housing Industry” (Economic Daily, 2010). Shenzhen enacted a “Build-
ing Energy Efficiency Regulation” in 2006, which for the first time speci-
fied the mandatory installation of SWH systems in public buildings, as
well as in residential buildings of 12 floors or below (SCSMPC, 2006).
The municipal government intended to make Qiaoxiang village a role
model of an energy-saving neighbourhood, with the installation of the
world's largest SWH system in high-rise buildings (Shenzhen Special
Zone Daily, 2016b). One government official explained:
Responding to national strategies to promote the appli-
cation of renewable energy in buildings, the municipal
government chose to pilot in government-funded
F IGURE 1 The layout of buildings in Qiaoxiang village (source: photo taken by the first author in Qiaoxiang village) [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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projects. Against this background, the Qiaoxiang village
became the first project in Shenzhen to install SWH
systems in high-rise residential buildings. This was also
a pioneering initiative in the country. (Shenzhen Spe-
cial Zone Daily, 2016a)
Qiaoxiang village is a public housing neighborhood, in which the hous-
ing was provided by the government as welfare (i.e., sold at much
lower prices than the market price) to qualified civil servants
(e.g., teachers, doctors, lawyers, and governmental officials) in
Shenzhen. Residents were selected based on a scoring system only
after the completion of the project. The municipal government
installed the SWH system for households to use the facilities free of
charge. Following practices of top-down governance, the municipal
government decided to pilot a new technology that was still immature
in a large-scale residential neighborhood (Shenzhen Special Zone
Daily, 2016a). Although a community was not yet formed to engage in
the planning and initiation of the project, the decision was made with-
out public consultation. As described by a resident:
In fact, I do know about the SWH system. I also
worked in the government. I know that at that time it
(the SWH system in Qiaoxiang village) was a national
(demonstration) project, pushed by the central govern-
ment. Hence the project was initiated when the tech-
nology was still immature.
The construction of Qiaoxiang village (along with the inte-
grated SWH system) was completed in 2009. In 2012, qualified
residents for public housing started to move in, and the SWH sys-
tem was put into use. Initially, residents were generally satisfied
with the integration of SWH systems in their housing. Some resi-
dents viewed the SWH system as welfare, or even as a privilege,
provided to them by the government. Others saw it as an opportu-
nity to embrace a greener lifestyle. As expressed by two
interviewees:
Using the SWH system is, in a sense, to answer the call
of the government to promote energy conservation
and protect the environment.
TABLE 1 Interview information























































TABLE 2 Main actors involved in the case of Qiaoxiang village
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SWH technology is undoubtedly environment-friendly. Of course,
I support the government's actions in energy saving and environmen-
tal protection. This is the most important [target].
However, there were also complaints from those residents who
were reluctant to use the SWH system. As recalled by a resident:
When I moved in, I wanted to use gas water heaters.
However, the government did not allow us to install
gas water heaters by ourselves. I had no choice. I know
some neighbours who installed a gas water heater
secretly when they decorated their houses. I should
have done that as well.
At least some residents accepted the government's decisions because
they felt that no choice was available to them. Even for those who
refused to use the installed SWH system, they resorted to informal
solutions, rather than to make formal complaints to the government,
thus tacitly accepting the guidelines.
Despite these different reactions, residents displayed a general
tendency to indifference. The rare complaints did not lead to active
resistance, and residents generally accepted what the government
offered. Conflicts, when they arose, were resolved by affected resi-
dents at the individual level. Resistance, while not visible at this stage,
gained traction during the project implementation and generated a
particular brand of defensive participation that reflects a more general
approach in climate governance in China, as explained below.
5.2 | The emergence of defensive participation
triggered by the bankruptcy of Prosunpro
The SWH system in Qiaoxiang village was installed and managed by
Shenzhen Prosunpro Solar Energy Company. Prosunpro was
established in 1993, specializing in solar energy applications. In 2008,
Prosunpro won the bidding for the Qiaoxiang village project. At the
end of 2014, the company went bankrupt. Interviews show that the
bankruptcy of Prosunpro acted as a trigger for the escalation of con-
flicts among residents and their defensive participation afterward.
Households had signed a 15-year-long contract with Prosunpro.
Prosunpro's bankruptcy left many issues unresolved, of which an
immediate consequence was the lack of daily maintenance and man-
agement of the SWH system. From February 2015, residents began
to complain frequently about the disrepair of some parts of the sys-
tem, resulting in instability of hot water, which was especially dis-
turbing in cold weather. The Property Owners Committee (POC,
yezhu weiyuanhui), an organization that is supposed to represent the
interests of residents of Qiaoxiang village, conducted official commu-
nication with the government.
The POC contacted the Housing and Construction Bureau of
Shenzhen Municipality (HCBSM). According to a meeting summary of
the POC, on June 4, 2015, the POC met with HCBSM for the first
time and discussed the issues concerning the SWH system in
Qiaoxiang village. Besides the meeting, the two parties also
communicated frequently through phone calls. First, the HCBSM
asked the POC to collect the overall opinions of residents who had
been using the SWH system. In August 2015, the POC organized the
first meeting with households. Later in October, a second meeting
was arranged by the POC with a preliminary questionnaire handed
out to residents who attended the meeting. The questionnaire was
designed to survey users' general opinions on the SWH system. How-
ever, as indicated by POC, there were different opinions during the
two meetings, and two stances emerged regarding whether or not to
abandon the SWH system. One side did not want to use the SWH
system and viewed the bankruptcy of Prosunpro as an opportunity to
urge the government to discard the whole system (Group B in
Table 2). In contrast, the other side thought the system itself was in
good condition and sought to find a new solar energy company to
replace Prosunpro in the daily management and maintenance of the
facilities (Group A in Table 2). The POC, which was supposed to repre-
sent all the residents in Qiaoxiang village and be relatively neutral,
strongly opposed the retaining of the SWH system. Rumors among
residents indicated that one influential member of the POC lived on
the top floor and suffered from an SWH-related noise problem, but
this information cannot be verified.
Unofficially, media became a channel for complaining. In
December 2015, desperate residents resorted to media to cover what
was happening in Qiaoxiang village after the bankruptcy of Prosunpro
company. The local press in Shenzhen covered this issue, questioning
the malfunction of the SWH system in cold winter and its lack of
management.
Individual measures could no longer address the problems of the
SWH system that surfaced after Prosunpro's bankruptcy. Residents,
in a desperate defense of their interests, resorted to both official and
unofficial channels to voice their complaints. Residents' stance
towards the installed SWH system changed from indifference and
passive acceptance to a proactive position. However, significant dis-
agreement among residents themselves meant that the credibility,
legitimacy, and effectiveness of participation, in this case, was put into
question.
5.3 | More defensive participation in response to
the government's transformation plan of the SWH
system
Ever since the bankruptcy of Prosunpro, the Shenzhen municipal gov-
ernment, or more specifically, the HCBSM, has shown their willing-
ness to resolve the problems of the SWH system in Qiaoxiang village.
For instance, HCBSM solicited residents' opinions through the POC
and even consulted local experts for possible technical solutions.
However, just like the POC, the HCBSM was more opt to (at least
partly) discard the SWH system. Underlying this stance were some
political calculations. First, although the trigger of the outbreak of var-
ious problems was the bankruptcy of Prosunpro, it was challenging to
find a new SWH company who would be willing to replace Prosunpro
and take care of the daily maintenance of the SWH system. The
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project was not considered profitable because the SWH system was
heavily subsidized by the government, and residents paid a meager
price for the use of hot water. Second, to maintain the SWH system,
the replacement of the aging equipment would be costly without solv-
ing issues such as noise and unstable hot water. With fewer residents
using the system, every household would need to pay more for daily
uses of hot water on average. Even if HCBSM could find a new SWH
company to replace Prosunpro, the SWH system would continue to
generate conflicts and social unrest in the future. At the same time, in
2016, the implementation of SWH technology in residential buildings
in Shenzen as a citywide strategy was regarded as unsuccessful
(Huang, Castán Broto, Liu, & Ma, 2018). The municipal government no
longer mandated the installation of SWH systems in buildings after
2014 and terminated the subsidy for SWH technology. Low carbon
priorities had shifted from SWH technology to solar photovoltaic
technology (HCBSM, 2014; HCBSM, 2015).
In April 2016, the HCBSM posted a notice in Qiaoxiang village.
Entitled “Notice on soliciting opinion on the transformation plans of
the SWH system,” the notice listed three options of transforming the
system: first, to maintain the whole body of the system, and only
repair some parts that cause primary problems such as noise and
leakage; second, to maintain the solar thermal system,1 but to dis-
card the air source heat pump system as an auxiliary heat source
and install instead gas water heaters for households; third, to aban-
don the whole SWH system, and replace it with gas water heaters
(Table 3). It is important to note that, along with this notice, a note
was provided indicating that plan A (retaining the system) actually
would not be considered as an option. This immediately triggered
the defensive participation of those residents who wanted to keep
the SWH system. The main reason behind these residents' stand-
point was that the transformation could cause damage to the cur-
rent decoration of their home, which is usually costly in China. To
get their voices heard by the government, they started to seek vari-
ous ways of participation.
In May 2016, Qiaoxiang village was intensively covered by South-
ern Metropolis Daily, a very popular and influential newspaper in
Guangdong province, the jurisdiction of Shenzhen city. The reports
sharply questioned HCBSM's intention of partly or entirely
abandoning the SWH system. In an interview, the journalist who
wrote these pieces of the report explained that he was initially
approached and contacted by a resident in Qiaoxiang village, who
was worried about the government's intention to discard the SWH
system. He wrote the first report on Qiaoxiang village on May
5, 2016. The next day, on May 6, 2016, the journalist gave a more
detailed coverage on the issue, and, on the same day, the HCBSM
called a media briefing to explain the whole issue of Qiaoxiang vil-
lage to the public. Southern Metropolis Daily was not invited by
the HCBSM as they usually are. The day after the media briefing
(May 7), two local media outlets reported the story of Qiaoxiang
village, indicating the government's intention of transforming the
SWH system, and explained the three options of the transforma-
tion plan. On May 9, 2016, the deputy director of HCBSM,
together with a group of officials and experts, went to Qiaoxiang
village and met with POC to discuss the transformation plan and
the progress of opinion solicitation. Resident representatives did
not attend this meeting.
The solicitation of opinion officially started on July 13. A ques-
tionnaire survey was distributed to every household using the SWH
system, who were asked to choose from the above three options of
the transformation plan. According to data released by HCBSM, until
July 31, 1,362 questionnaires were handed out and 1,274 collected,
of which 355 households selected plan A, 514 plan B, 196 plan C, and
209 abstained. Based on the results of this questionnaire survey,
HCBSM made the final decision of choosing plan B as the transforma-
tion plan, under which the solar thermal system would be retained,
but an auxiliary heat source, the ASHP system, would be replaced by
gas water heaters. According to HCBSM, the expenses for trans-
forming the system would be covered by the government, and resi-
dents could even get compensation for possible damages to the
existing decoration of their houses.
Measures such as the questionnaire survey led by the govern-
ment are often interpreted as efforts to make the decision-making
process transparent and inclusive, trying to involve every stakeholder
and giving them opportunities of expressing their opinions. However,
residents saw it as a policy tool that had to be disputed. For example,
one resident recalled:
They gave us three options to choose from… But the
questionnaire was misleading. Under the option of plan
A (retaining the SWH system), they listed many disad-
vantages of this plan. They also gave a deadline; after
that date, if we changed our mind, they would not
replace the facility for us.
Moreover, media, as an essential channel for defensive participa-
tion, seemed to have been, as termed by an interviewee, “controlled”
by the government. After the intensive critical coverage of Qiaoxiang
village in May 2016 by Southern Metropolis Daily, starting from July,
media coverage, which often followed key moves of HCBSM, seemed
to become highly identical in covering dates and the main content
(with a similar stance to HCBSM's). Meanwhile, the previous journalist
TABLE 3 Transformation plans provided by HCBSM
Transformation
plan Solution
Plan A To maintain the whole body of the system, and
repair some parts that cause major problems
such as noise and leakage
Plan B To keep the solar thermal system, but discard the
air source heat pump system as the auxiliary
heat source and install gas water heaters
instead in every apartment.
Plan C To abandon the whole SWH system, and replace
it with gas water heaters
Abbreviations: HCBSM, housing and construction bureau of Shenzhen
municipality; SWH, solar water heating.
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from Southern Metropolis Daily, who took a very critical stance on
HCBSM, was replaced by a different journalist.
Under this situation, some residents who opposed HCBSM's deci-
sion started to resort to more formal means of participation: reporting
to superior institutions. They wrote and sent letters to the Mayor of
Shenzhen, as well as the central inspection group (zhongyang
xunshizu), and expressed their strong opposition to the transformation
of the SWH system. This mechanism of participation represents a
flow of opinion from bottom-up (residents to higher-level government
institutions) ! top-down (higher-level government institutions to
lower-level government departments). This tactic seemed to be very
effective: although HCBSM retrieved the final results of the question-
naire survey in late July, until September, there had not been any con-
crete moves from HCBSM.
On September 1, 2016, HCBSM organized a meeting, in which
both sides of resident representatives, the POC, experts, and media
were invited. The main aim of this meeting was to reach an agreement
on the final decision of the transformation plan. After the meeting,
media coverage indicated that critical stakeholders had reached a con-
sensus, with the final choice of plan B over the other two options. An
interviewee stated that fierce confrontations had taken place
between the two sides in this meeting. According to this interviewee,
the “consensus” claimed by HCBSM and the media was not reached,
because HCBSM and the POC had manipulated the participation pro-
cess. Nevertheless, the transformation project formally started on
November 21, 2016, and until December, 75 households had com-
pleted the installation of gas water heaters in their houses. Mean-
while, some residents who opposed the plan continued writing to
superior institutions, such as the central inspection group (the latest
letter received on December 6, 20162). The two sides seem to have
been stuck in a deadlock ever since.
6 | DISCUSSION: CLIMATE
PARTICIPATION WITH CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS
The case of solar energy implementation in Qiaoxiang village offers
insights into the mechanisms and features of climate participation
within the Chinese context. Defensive participation depends on the
evolution of action in response to external events. Figure 2 presents
the timeline of key events marking the different stages of defensive
participation in Qiaoxiang village.
First, the case captures a distinct form of climate participation in
China—defensive participation. This form of involvement is reactive
because it depends on residents' engagement to defend their inter-
ests. In this case, residents were originally indifferent to the manda-
tory use of the SWH system and tended to absorb any problems or
inconveniences. Before the government's decisions had a tangible
impact on their lifestyles, residents showed a strong tendency
towards non-participation and nonengagement. When problems
emerged after Prosunpro's bankruptcy, residents resorted to informal
channels of complaining (e.g., media). If the bankruptcy of Prosunpro
triggered defensive participation of those who wanted to get rid of
the SWH system (Group B in Table 2), the government's announce-
ment of the transformation plan provoked defensive participation of
those who wanted to retain the system (Group A of Table 2). Regard-
less of their actual interests, both sides showed strong motivations to
participate, to get their voices heard, and eventually, to influence the
outcomes of decision-making. This finding challenges the general
impression of nonparticipation of Chinese residents in climate gover-
nance and indicates that the extent to which public participation is
visible in China depends very much on the extent to which proposed
interventions jeopardize the local communities' interests. It follows
F IGURE 2 Timeline of key events [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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that defensive participation is most likely to happen in the implementa-
tion of technologies that are closely related to people's daily life, such as
the SWH technology. This is particularly the case when there has not
been sufficient preproject public participation necessary to avoid
unintended social consequences that would trigger defensive
participation.
Second, the case of Qiaoxiang village shows how defensive par-
ticipation can function as a last resort mechanism to ensure account-
ability in a semi-authoritarian state. When climate policies fail to
deliver the intended outcomes at the local level, defensive participa-
tion provides the government with a clear signal of the need for policy
adjustment. HCBSM's prompt response to the problem after the
bankruptcy of the SWH company proved the effectiveness of this
form of participation. The transformation plan of the SWH system
and the compensation offered to affected residents revealed
HCBSM's willingness to take the responsibility to resolve the issue.
Although HCBSM's apparent stance to abandon the SWH system has,
to a certain extent, jeopardized the credibility and legitimacy of the
formal participation process led by HCBSM, the defensive participa-
tion of residents in Qiaoxiang village did ensure the accountability of
policymakers. Further, it pushed HCBSM to not only look for solutions
in a single case but also think critically about the overall strategy of
SWH implementation in the city. The termination of the citywide
mandatory installation regulation signals a policy learning process.
This means that defensive participation can be a governance function
employed to enhance the legitimacy of local policy experimentation
(Heilmann, 2008), through which the disadvantages of new programs
are communicated to local or national decision-makers.
Third, concerning the mechanisms of participation, residents
engaged in several strategies to mobilize support for their concerns—
all of which met with significant difficulties. Previous studies have
documented opportunities to engage with political processes through
media channels in China (e.g., Chilvers & Longhurst, 2012; Pallett,
Chilvers, & Hargreaves, 2019; Segerberg & Bennett, 2011; Tang,
2014). The community in Qiaoxiang village attempted to express
resistance through media but found that news channels were highly
controlled by political actors. When accessing formal news became
difficult, residents resorted to higher-level authorities to exert pres-
sure on lower-level government entities. This way of voicing concern
has proved to be fairly effective, mainly because of the authoritarian
nature of the political system in China. However, as a double-edged
sword, available channels for questioning the legitimacy of formal par-
ticipation channels provided by the government can also be narrowed
down under authoritarian institutions. There is, therefore, a need for a
greater diversity of channels of expression such as community work-
shops and digital participation platforms, to facilitate problem-solving
in the implementation and management of low carbon projects.
7 | CONCLUSION
In recent years, environmental authoritarianism seems to be gaining
ground in the narratives of climate governance (Beeson, 2010;
Sowers, 2007). Scholars have praised China's efforts in sustainability
transitions in relation to actions from renewable energy to flood man-
agement, as representing an effective and efficient top-down
approach of climate governance. Our study takes a critical view of this
opinion. What on the surface appears to be a rare case of community
participation in authoritarian China, could also be described as a dem-
onstration of the intricate multilevel sustainability politics that take
place in that country. Our case study suggests that participation
occurs in China, but not always in the style and models that have been
popularized in the environmental and climate governance literature,
influenced by cases in global regions generically referred to as the
global north. Climate governance in China is the result of multilayered
processes of negotiation and conflict, rather than the smooth out-
come of top-down regulations.
The case of Qiaoxiang village demonstrates the operation of less
visible forms of public participation, which, in this case, we regard as
“defensive participation.” The case shows how citizens mobilize to
intervene in climate governance, particularly when climate governance
impacts their everyday experiences. At the local level, defensive par-
ticipation serves as an essential communication mechanism between
citizens and policymakers to ensure that societal needs are addressed
and public goods are delivered. Just as other forms of participation,
defensive participation can influence policy outcomes and improve
the accountability of policymakers. Under the authoritarian institu-
tional system in China, channels for defensive participation are usually
limited and highly controlled by the government. However, multi-level
governance interactions are diversifying and providing new channels
of participation, through for instance, mechanisms for reporting to
higher-level authorities. The form of defensive participation uncov-
ered in Qiaoxiang village is an indictment against an uncritical defense
of authoritarian approaches to climate governance that focus on
short-term outcomes of climate initiatives while neglecting long-
lasting post-project interactions among communities.
In different contexts, public participation is also increasingly
achieved through a diverse range of creative strategies led by citizens.
“Defensive participation” is but one example of the multiple channels
whereby Chinese citizens are engaging in climate participation. Defen-
sive participation may also happen at the margins of current governance
structures, against state-led designs, and at considerable risks to those
who engage in climate governance. However, even if it appears only as a
responsive model of governance, these innovative forms of participation
have the potential to have a long-lasting impact on the policy context in
China. The diverse types of participation emerging in China call for new
conceptualizations of public participation in climate governance beyond
the West, and the consideration of climate governance approaches that




1 The SWH system installed in Qiaoxiang village is actually the solar
assisted air source heat pump (SA-ASHP) system. ASHP functions as
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auxiliary heat source. According to investigation of experts, the noise
problem is mainly caused by the ASHP system.
2 http://news.ifeng.com/a/20161212/50401283_0.shtml
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